Tag Archive: OSPF

Setting up a routing protocol neighborship isn’t hard. In fact, it’s so easy I’ve made them by accident! How? There were already two OSPF neighbors in a subnet and I was configuring a third router for OSPF with yet another fourth router. But because the third router had an interface in that same subnet and I used the command ‘network area 0’ the neighborships came up. This serves as an example that securing a neighborship is not only to avoid malicious intent, but also to minimize human error.

Session authentication
The most straightforward way to secure a neighborship is adding a password to the session. However, this is not as perfect as it should be: it doesn’t encrypt the session so everyone can still read it, and the hash used is usually done in md5, which can easily be broken at the time of writing. Nevertheless, a quick overview of the password protection for EIGRP, OSPF and BGP:

Router(config)#key chain KEY-EIGRP
Router(config-keychain)#key 1
Router(config-keychain-key)#key string
Router(config)#interface Fa0/0
Router(config-if)#ip authentication mode eigrp 65000 md5
Router(config-if)#ip authentication key-chain eigrp 65000 KEY-EIGRP

Router(config)#interface Fa0/1
Router(config-if)#ip ospf message-digest-key 1 md5
Router(config)#router ospf 1
Router(config-router)#area 0 authentication message-digest

Router(config)#router bgp 65000
Router(config-router)#neighbor remote-as 65000
Router(config-router)#neighbor password

Note a few differences. EIGRP uses a key chain. The positive side about this is that multiple keys can be used, each with his own lifetime. The downside: administrative overhead and unless the keys change every 10 minutes it’s not of much use. I doubt anyone uses this in a production network.

BGP does the configuration for a neighbor (or a peer-group of multiple peers at the same time for scalability). Although there’s no mention of hashing, it still uses md5. It works with eBGP as well but you’ll need to agree on this with the service provider.

OSPF sets the authentication key on the interface and can activate authentication on the interface, but here it’s shown in the routing process, as it’s likely you’ll want it on all interfaces. It would have been even better if it was possible to configure the key under the routing process, saving some commands and possible misconfigurations on the interfaces. OSPF authentication commands can be confusing, as Jeremy points out. However:

OSPFv3 authentication using IPsec
The new OSPF version allows for more. Now before you decide that you’re not using this because you don’t run IPv6, let it be clear that OSPFv3 can be used for IPv4 as well. OSPFv3 does run on top of IPv6, but only link-local addresses. This means that you need IPv6 enabled on the interfaces, but you don’t need IPv6 routing and there’s no need to think about an IPv6 addressing scheme.

Router(config)#router ospfv3 1
Router(config-router)#address-family ipv4 unicast
Router(config-router-af)#area 0 authentication ipsec spi 256 sha1 8a3fe4a551b81dc24f6148b03e865b803fec49f7
Router(config)#interface Fa0/0
Router(config-if)#ipv6 enable
Router(config-if)#ospfv3 1 area 0 ipv4
Router(config-if)#ospfv3 bfd

This new OSPF version shows two advantages: you can configure authentication per area instead of per interface, and you can use SHA1 for hashing. The key has to be a 40-digit hex string, it will not accept anything else. A non-hex character or 39 or 41 digits gives a confusing ‘command not recognized’ error. The SPI vaue needs to be the same on both sides, just like the key of course. The final command is to show optional BFD support.

EIGRP static neighbors
For EIGRP you can define the neighbors on the router locally, instead of discovering them using multicast. This way, the router will not allow any neighborships from untrusted routers.

Router(config)#router eigrp 65000
Router(config-router)#neighbor Fa0/0

Static neighbor definition is one command, but there is a consequence: EIGRP will stop multicasting hello packets on he interface where the static neighbor is. This is expected behavior, but easily forgotten when setting it up. Also, the routing process still needs the ‘network’ command to include that interface, or nothing will happen.

BGP Secure TTL
Small yet useful: checking TTL for eBGP packets. By default an eBGP session uses a TTL of 1. By issuing the ‘neighbor ebgp-multihop ‘ you can change this value. The problem is that an attacker can send SYN packets towards a BGP router with a spoofed source of a BGP peer. This will force the BGP router to respond to the session request (SYN) with a half-open session (SYN-ACK). Many half-open sessions can overwelm the BGP process and bring it down entirely.


Secure TTL solves this by changing the way TTL is checked: instead of setting it to the hop count where the eBGP peer expects a TTL of 1, the TTL is set to 255 to begin with, and the peer checks upon arrival of the packet if the TTL is 255 minus the number of hops. Result: an attacker can send spoofed SYN packets, but since he’ll be more hops away and the TTL can’t be set higher than 255, the packets will arrive with a too low TTL value and are dropped without any notification. The configuration needs to be done on both sides:

Router(config)#router bgp 1234
Router(config-router)#neighbor remote-as 2345
Router(config-router)#neighbor ttl-security hops

These simple measures can help defend against the unexpected, and although it’s difficult in reality to implement them in a live network, it’s good to know when (re)designing.


Another series of articles. So far in my blog, I’ve concentrated on how to get routed networks running with basic configuration. But at some point, you may want to refine the configuration to provide better security, better failover, less chance for unexpected issues, and if possible make things less CPU and memory intensive as well.

While I was recently designing and implementing a MPLS network, it got clear that using defaults everywhere wasn’t the best way to proceed. As visible in the MPLS-VPN article, several different protocols are used: BGP, OSPF and LDP. Each of these establishes a neighborship with the next-hop, all using different hello timers to detect issues: 60 seconds for BGP, 10 seconds for OSPF and 5 seconds for LDP.

First thing that comes to mind is synchronizing these timers, e.g. setting them all to 5 seconds and a 15 second dead-time. While this does improve failover, there’s three keepalives going over the link to check if the link works, and still several seconds of failover. It would be better to bind all these protocols to one common keepalive. UDLD comes to mind, but that’s to check fibers if they work in both directions, it needs seconds to detect a link failure, and only works between two adjacent layer 2 interfaces. The ideal solution would check layer 3 connectivity between two routing protocol neighbors, regardless of switched path in between. This would be useful for WAN links, where fiber signal (the laser) tends to stay active even if there’s a failure in the provider network.


Turns out this is possible: Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) can do this. BFD is an open-vendor protocol (RFC 5880) that establishes a session between two layer 3 devices and periodically sends hello packets or keepalives. If the packets are no longer received, the connection is considered down. Configuration is fairly straightforward:

Router(config-if)#bfd interval 50 min_rx 50 multiplier 3

The values used above are all minimum values. The first 50 for ‘interval’ is how much time in milliseconds there is between hello packets. The ‘mix_rx’ is the expected receive rate for hello packets. Documentation isn’t clear on this and I was unable to see a difference in reaction in my tests if this parameter was changed. The ‘multiplier’ value is how many hello packets kan be missed before flagging the connection as down. The above configuration will trigger a connection issue after 150 ms. The configuration needs to be applied on the remote interface as well, but that will not yet activate BFD. It needs to be attached to a routing process on both sides before it starts to function. It will take neighbors from those routing processes to communicate with. Below I’m listing the commands for OSPF, EIGRP and BGP:

Router(config)#router ospf 1
Router(config-router)#bfd all-interfaces
Router(config)#router eigrp 65000
Router(config-router)#bfd all-interfaces
Router(config)#router bgp 65000
Router(config-router)#neighbor fall-over bfd

This makes the routing protocols much more responsive to link failures. For MPLS, the LDP session cannot be coupled with BFD on a Cisco device, but on a Juniper it’s possible. This is not mandatory as the no frames will be sent on the link anymore as soon as the routing protocol neighborships break and the routing table (well, the FIB) is updated.

Result: fast failover, relying on a dedicated protocol rather than some out-of-date default timers:

Router#show bfd neighbor

NeighAddr                         LD/RD    RH/RS     State     Int                       1/1     Up        Up        Fa0/1

Jun 29 14:16:21.148: %OSPF-5-ADJCHG: Process 1, Nbr on FastEthernet0/1 from FULL to DOWN, Neighbor Down: BFD node down

Not bad for a WAN line.

If you ever managed a Campus LAN, you’ll know what happens with a lot of end users that have access to ethernet cables on desks. The occasional rogue hub, a loop now and then, and if they have access to some more advanced tools, some BPDU’s and a rogue DHCP server. Most of these events are not intended to be malicious (even the BPDU’s and rogue DHCP), but they happen because end users are not aware of the impact of some devices on the network.

But, given a malicious intend, what are the possibilities of attacking a switched Cisco network from a directly attached interface? Operating system for all the upcoming attacks: BackTrack Linux, which has many interesting tools installed.

MAC Flood
The classic attack first: flooding the switch’s CAM table with random source MAC addresses.
Tool: macof
Countermeasure: port-security

First attacking without port security: as expected, CAM table fills, CPU increases and everything is flooded. Congestion everywhere.


Finding this attack without port-security is feasible by checking CPU processes: HLFM address learning doesn’t normally consume that much CPU. Turning of MAC address learning does the same but without CPU impact.

So does turning port-security on solve the problem? It depends. Turning it on and setting it to only block new mac addresses but not shutting down the port actually makes things worse for the CPU:


The best solution: port-security with shutdown of the port in case of too many MAC addresses. No flooding, no CPU hogging.

CDP Flood
A Cisco-only attack. Flooding CDP frames with fake neighbors, causing not only CPU spikes, but also clogging the memory with all the neighbor entries. ‘show cdp neighbor’ becomes like showing the route table on a BGP router: endless.
Tool: Yersinia
Countermeasure: disabling CDP on the port or globally.

The attack with CDP turned on (the default) is very effective:


Finding the attack is easy, as both CPU and memory will clearly show the CDP process is using up resources. However, without CDP on the port, the attack does nothing. So the best solution: always turn CDP off towards a user-facing port. Even behind an IP Phone, although some functionality will be lost.

Root BPDU inject
A funny one. Inject a BPDU claiming to be root to cause spanning-tree recalculations and creating suboptimal paths in the network.
Tool: Yersinia
Countermeasure: Root Guard.


Notice the root ID, which has a nearly identical MAC address to make it difficult to spot the difference, and the aging time of two days, making this an attack that will last while the attacker is no longer connected. Root Guard on the port counters this attack easily though.

BPDU Flood
This attack doesn’t try to change the spanning-tree topology, but rather overload the STP process. Consequence is high CPU and eventually spanning tree inconsistencies.
Tool: Yersinia
Countermeasure: BPDU Guard


Spanning-tree should not use that much CPU on a switch. HLFM address learning will increase too due to the random source MAC addresses, and depending on the switch, Hulc LED Process will increase too. This is the process that governs the LED status of all switchports: the more ports the switch, the more this process will consume CPU if flooding attacks are happening.

BPDU Guard stops this effectively by shutting down the port. BPDU Filter not so much: it still needs to look at the BPDU to drop it and not forward it in hardware. BPDU Filter is generally not recommended anyway.

DHCP Discover Flood
Not really a layer 2 attack, but still impacting for the local subnet. Sending a flood of DHCP Discover messages, quickly overloading the DHCP Server(s) for the subnet.
Tool: Yersinia
Countermeasure: DHCP Snooping and DHCP Snooping Rate Limit

If DHCP Snooping isn’t enabled on the switch, it behaves like a MAC Flood attack and can be countered accordingly. Simply enabling DHCP Snooping, which is against rogue servers and not against flooding, makes things worse.

L2Attack-6Not only does it make the CPU spike, but it’s one of the few attacks that makes the switch unresponsive in the data plane, meaning not only management is lost, but the switch stops forwarding most frames, with packet loss on all ports. Simple snooping does prevent execution from a virtual machine:


But to really protect against this attack, DHCP Snooping rate-limiting helps:


OSPF Flood
Sending a flood of OSPF Hello packets over a switch.
Tool: a virtual machine running ospfd (Vyatta, OpenBSD), and a hub between switch and computer with cable loop to cause the flood.
Countermeasure: ACL

For this one I didn’t use any specific tool. I just made my computer send out an OSPF Hello, and made sure the hub between computer and switch was wired so it would flood the frame. Result: spectacular. The switch CPU rises to 100% and management connections, including console, are dropped. Reason is that the OSPF process has higher priority. But now the shocking part: this was done on a layer 3 Cisco switch without OSPF configured, and without an IP address in the attacker VLAN.

Explanation: Cisco switches use something called pak_priority. It means that certain packets on ingress are labeled by the interface driver as priority and to be checked by CPU (Source). This is done to make sure network control packets get to the CPU in case of congestion. It’s the case for RIP, OSPF and EIGRP, but not for BGP packets.

I retried it with EIGRP (although this required a second Cisco device to generate the EIGRP hello) and the result is the same: no EIGRP configuration on the switch, still impact. The data plane does not have any impact: forwarding stays as usual mostly.

Solution? Strange enough, an ACL on each port blocking EIGRP (IP Protocol 88) and OSPF (IP Protocol 89) and allowing everything else seems to work. The ACL is checked in hardware as long as the ‘log’ parameter isn’t present. So for better security, it seems you’re stuck with an ACL on each switchport of a layer 3 switch.

I’m sure most of the readers now conclude that there’s still a security leak somewhere in their network. Just for reference, I’ll include the CPU graph of an hour of testing all these attacks.


If you’re working in a large enterprise with its own AS and public range(s), you’ll probably recognize the following image:


On top, the internet with BGP routers, peering with multiple upstream providers and advertising the public range(s), owned by the company. Below that, multiple firewalls or routers (but I do hope firewalls). Those devices either provide internet access to different parts of the company network, or provide internet access to different customers. Whatever the case, they will have a default route pointing towards the BGP routers (a nice place for HSRP/VRRP).

Vice versa, the BGP routers have connectivity to the firewalls in the connected subnet, but they must also have a route for each NAT range towards the firewalls. This is often done using static routes: for each NAT range, a static route is defined on the BGP routers, with a firewall as a next hop. On that firewall, those NAT addresses are used, e.g. if the BGP has a route for, those four (yes, including broadcast and network) addresses can be used to NAT a server or users behind, even if those aren’t present on any interface in that firewall.

The problem in this setup is that it quickly becomes a great administrative burden, and since all the firewalls have a default route pointing towards the BGP routers, traffic between firewalls travels an extra hop. Setting up static routing for all the NAT ranges on each firewall is even more of a burden, and forgotten routes introduce asymmetric routing, where the return path is through the BGP. And while allocating one large public NAT range to each firewall sounds great in theory, reality is that networks tend to grow beyond their designed capacity and new NAT ranges must be allocated from time to time, as more servers are deployed. Perhaps customers even pay for each public IP they have. Can this be solved with dynamic routing? After all, the NAT ranges aren’t present on any connected subnet.

Yes, it’s possible! First, set up a dynamic routing protocol with all routers in the connected public subnet. Personally, I still prefer OSPF. In this design, the benefit of OSPF is the DR and BDR concept: set these to the BGP routers so they efficiently multicast routing updates to all firewalls. Next, on all firewalls, allow the redistribution of static routes, preferably with an IP prefix filter that allows only subnets in your own public IP range, used for NAT. Finally, if you need a NAT range, you just create a Null route on the firewall that needs it (e.g. to Null0), and the route will automatically be redistributed into OSPF towards the BGP routers, who will send updates to all other firewalls. Problem solved!

But what about that Null route? Won’t packets be discarded? No, because this is where a particular logic of NAT comes into play: NAT translations are always done before the next hop is calculated. A packet entering with destination address pointing towards a Null route (e.g. will first be translate to the private IP address, after which the route lookup gives a connected subnet or another route further into the private network. The Null route is never actually used!

IPv4 anycast design.

Today, not a new protocol or device, but something else: an anycast design. In IPv6, an anycast address is an address that is in use by multiple devices. A packet destined for this address is sent to one of the devices only, either at random, load balanced, or by shortest distance (geographical location or metric). This article will show a design that does that in IPv4. The anycast service used will be DNS, but it can be anything, going from DNS, DHCP, NTP to protocols that use sessions like HTTP, although it does not provide any stateful failover in case a server fails.


The above design shows a head quarters (HQ) with two DNS servers, and a branch office with one local DNS server. In a ‘standard’ design, the three DNS servers would have three different IP’s, e.g. and in the HQ, and in the branch office. The users in the HQ would have as primary DNS and as secondary, with perhaps some subnets doing vice versa to balance the load a bit. The branch office users would use the local DNS as primary, and one of the HQ DNS as backup.

Such a design works and has redundancy, but has a few minor setbacks: in case a DNS fails, the users using it as a primary DNS will have to query the primary, which is down, followed by the secondary. This takes time and slows the systems. Also, a sudden failure of the branch office DNS may put a sudden high load on one of the HQ DNS, as most operating systems only have up to two DNS servers configured by default. The design can be enhanced by implementing anycast-like routing. This can be done in two ways: routed anycast and tracked anycast.

The routed anycast design requires that the DNS servers run a routing protocol, which is achieved easiest by using Unix/Linux operating systems. Each server has a loopback configured with an address like Routing is enabled on the server and the address is advertised, for example by OSPF. Each server listens on the loopback for DNS requests, and management is done by the physical interface to still differentiate between DNS servers. The is advertised by OSPF throughout the company. Even if it’s advertised from multiple locations, the only one used in each router is the one with the lowest metric, and thus the shortest distance.

The tracked anycast design works without the hosts running a routing protocol, but they still need the loopback with the IP address and routing configured. This makes it more accessible for any kind of server, including Windows. The routers are configured to track the state of the DNS servers using ping, or even by DNS requests. These tracking objects are then used to decide when a static route towards the loopback address of the DNS server is left in the routing table or not:

R1(config)#ip route track 1

The route is then redistributed in the dynamic routing protocol. This design has several advantages:

  • You need just one IP address for the server and it’s a /32, which means it can be an easy to remember number that is equal in the entire company.
  • You no longer need to figure out which server is closest to the subnet, the routing protocols will do that for you.
  • In case two servers are on an equal distance, they will appear as two equal-cost routes in the routing table and load-balancing will automatically occur.
  • A failure of one of the servers is automatically corrected, and no hosts will have unreachable servers configured.
  • Because the management IP differs from the IP used for the service, it allows for better security or easier defined firewall rules.

The biggest drawbacks of the design are the extra configuration (though this is debatable since the anycast IP is easy to use), and convergence of the routing protocol may make the service temporarily unreachable, which means fine tuning of timers is required.

In this third part of my series of OpenBSD posts, I’ll cover static routing and OSPF. Routing between connected interfaces is already covered in part I, but that doesn’t get you very far in a bigger network.

First static routes: these are very easy to configure, just type ‘route add subnet gateway‘, where subnet is the subnet or prefix, and gateway‘ the next-hop IP, e.g. ‘route add’ defines a static route for to Simple as that.

But just like with the other commands so far, this doesn’t persist after a reboot. To do this, the commands have to be automatically loaded at boot, which means they’ll have to be specified in a file that loads at boot time. Best candidates are /etc/rc.local and an interface config file, e.g. /etc/hostname.em0. Just add the command on a line, preceded by ‘!’, e.g. ‘!route add’, and save the file in vi.

OSPF takes OpenBSD to a whole new level, making it capable of supporting large network topologies. It has to be enabled on boot first by modifying the /etc/rc.conf file. After opening, find the ‘ospfd_flags=NO’ line and remove the ‘NO’ (don’t place anything else, just leave the line empty). After this, you can modify the OSPF behaviour in /etc/ospfd.conf. Below a simple sample configuration:


area {

interface em0
interface em1 {




The router-id speaks for itself. Area means area 0, in which interfaces em0 and em1 are participating. Interface em1 is defined as passive. Basically everything that’s possible on a Cisco router is possible here too, except NSSA which is Cisco-only.

In my case, this still doesn’t work. Why? Because of the pf settings: I haven’t allowed the interface IP to send traffic to For this, I add the rule ‘pass out quick on em0 from to’ to /etc/pf.conf. After this OpenBSD starts sending out OSPF Hello’s, so if you’re ever having trouble with this, check pf.

Since I’m working multi-vendor already, I’m adding an extra here and boot up a Vyatta 6.3 and Cisco 3560, configure OSPF, and connect them to the same subnet. This is the result:

ospfd is the Vyatta, the Cisco. Through some reboots the Cisco became the only active device at a certain moment, thus becoming DR. Both the Vyatta and the Cisco show an OSPF route for the em1 interface of OpenBSD, so everything works.

Another subject in which I frequently see false claims and misunderstandings to people new in the field: link-state routing and distance vector routing. Also frequently the ‘RIP vs EIGRP vs OSPF discussion’.

First, I have to admit that the CCNA course really covers this poorly. It gives definitions and how to configure the protocols, but not the subtle difference. As such, some people even start categorizing EIGRP as link-state protocol. Why? Because EIGRP has triggered updates, just like OSPF. Unline RIP, which sents out updates every 30 seconds by default.

Yet this is not the important part. What is important is how these routes are calculated. RIP and EIGRP take connected subnets, add a metric to it, and send them to the other routers. Those routers, in turn, add metric to this route (hop count in RIP), and sent them on to the next routers. As a subnet is propagated through the network, the metric increases. A router on the other side of the network that receives an advertised subnet multiple times simply has to select the one with the lowest metric.

Link-state works different: the subnets are advertised from router to router without a metric. There is no increasing metric when the subnet is propagated from one router to the next. What does count is that each link is given a metric, and those links are advertised. So each router in a given area receives a bunch of subnets and a bunch of links through Link-State Advertisements (LSAs). Each router then runs Dijkstra’s algorithm to calculate the shortest path themselves.

So in one phrase: distance vector routers send out ‘this subnet is this much metric away for me’, link-state routers send out ‘this subnet is located here, and I have these links’.

Following that logic, it should be clear now that EIGRP is not a link-state protocol. Not even a so-called ‘hybrid’ protocol. It’s just a distance vector protocol with fancy triggered updates.

This also explains some other OSPF behavior: this is why point-to-point links are treated different from broadcast subnets, because the calculation varies slightly. Link-state also uses slightly more CPU compared to distance vector. And this is why filtering can only be done between areas on an ABR, or on an ASBR. Between areas distance vector logic is applied. Inside an area, every router has the same link-state database. This makes it impossible to filter LSAs, but also nearly impossible to create routing loops inside an area as all routers have all knowledge. OSPF is a very resilient protocol. To form a loop, something like a wrong static route or improper distribution between areas should happen.

And finally, it also explains why an OSPF router-id has to be unique, whereas this is not that important in EIGRP: distance vector does not care about other routers, just advertised metric. Link-state needs to uniquely identify each router and it’s links.